From: Advancing the application of systems thinking in health: why cure crowds out prevention
Equilibrium parameters | Variable type | Initial value | Notes and assumptions |
---|---|---|---|
Doctor power | State | 1,000 | Doctor’s lobbying power at equilibrium; equals PCW power at equilibrium |
Doctor spending on lobbying | Rate | 0 | Doctor power × Proportion on lobbying |
Proportion on lobbying of doctors | Auxiliary | 0.125 | Doctors spent 12.5% of their resources on lobbying |
Doctor spending on patient services | Rate | 0 | Doctor power × (1–Proportion on lobbying of doctors) |
PCW power | State | 1,000 | PCW’s lobbying power at equilibrium; PCWs and doctors start with the same level of power |
PCW spending on lobbying | Rate | 0 | PCW power × Proportion on lobbying of PCWs |
Proportion on lobbying of PCWs | Auxiliary | 0.5 | PCWs spend 50% of their resources on lobbying |
PCWs spending on prevention of disease B | Rate | 0 | PCW power × (1-Proportion on lobbying of PCWs) |